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Abstract
This research investigates the effect of political risk on the offshore service industry. The study
empirically examines how an extended political risk definition, operationalised into a model
consisting of 12 political risk variables, helps predict location decisions across offshoring entry
modes and activity types. The research focuses on captive offshoring and offshore outsourcing
entry modes, and Information Technology Outsourcing (ITO), Business Process Outsourcing
(BPO) and Knowledge Process Outsourcing (KPO) activity types. The research indicated that
political risk factors accounted for 38% of the variability in offshore outsourcing flows, implying
that concerns about service disruptions and/or cost implications of external uncertainties feature
as a key factor in supplier selection and location decisions. The findings further confirm a positive
relationship between institutional and regulatory factors in host locations, and the flow of
offshoring activities with a high knowledge content. The research contributes to enhancing the
explanatory ability of Transaction Cost Economics by re-operationalising the concept of political
risk in the context of both offshore outsourcing and captive offshoring. For practitioners, these
findings provide a clear indication of the political risks that can affect service offshoring decisions;
for policymakers, they highlight the importance of strengthening institutional and regulatory
factors to attract investment.




The offshore service industry has traditionally been driven by the objective of identifying more
cost-effective business process solutions through leveraging cost arbitrage and talent pools across
regions (Cui et al. 2017; Dolgui and Proth 2013; Williamson 2008). Common examples of globally
sourced services include labour-intensive call centres, remote information technology application
maintenance work, and software development (e.g. Cui et al. 2017; Goo et al. 2008; Gopal and
Koka 2010). As the business model for offshoring has matured, companies have proceeded to
apply it to ever more complex and integrated global networks of interdependent subsidiaries or
suppliers and geo-locations, improving efficiencies at the cost of increased exposure to political
risk (Ang and Inkpen 2008; Asmussen et al. 2016; Contractor et al. 2010; Lewin et al. 2009).
While political risk is not a new phenomenon, the spread of offshoring has increased firms’
exposure to various kinds of politically motivated actions that represent a direct challenge to the
performance of offshoring strategies (Peng et al. 2008; Hätönen and Eriksson 2009). The
emerging variety of these non-business risks include direct or indirect actions in the political
environment of the host country, like license cancellation, governmental interference, confiscation
of assets, and other political events, with various levels disruption potential (Palugod and Palugod
2011). The risks include security exposure linked to politically motivated riots, strikes, sabotage,
and terrorism, impacting directly or indirectly on operational performance (Monaghan 2010).
There is no consensus definition of political risk in the offshoring literature, and as a result
the term has been applied across a broad range of risk types and contexts (Alon et al. 2006; Alon
and Herbert 2009). Despite the expanding literature base, no specific definition has yet been
developed that considers the unique dimensions of political risk in global supply or service chains;
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instead, the literature provides a range of independent conceptualisations that fail to distinguish
terms such as risk, uncertainty, and vulnerability (Manuj and Mentzer 2008).
Political risk has traditionally been referred to as “discontinuities” (Robock 1971; Kobrin
1981) and considered to be limited to actions of national governments (Kobrin 1979), mainly
involving confiscation, contract repudiation, currency inconvertibility, discriminatory taxation,
embargo, expropriation of property, nationalisation, or war risk (Howell 2007). While earlier
definitions of political risk focused on the role and actions of national governments (Gilliespie
1989), actions in the political domain resulting in business losses no longer necessarily emanate
from the government itself. Often national governments are not the authoritative source of loss
problems, meaning that increasingly regional, provincial, state, and local governments are dealing
with investors directly in ways that the national governments are unable to control (Howell 1992).
Other external agents such as nationalistic buyers, suppliers, employees and other stakeholders can
cause disruption outside the control of legitimate governments (Agarwal and Feils 2007; Hahn et
al. 2009; Hanner 1979; Hansen et al. 2017).
A wider political risk definition needs to recognise that risk emanates from political
processes which are influenced by various environmental variables or on-going change
(Fitzpatrick 1983). On-going change, takes the form of continuous activities such as
macroeconomic management and monetary policy, legislation, and social or political evolution,
which affect the overall business environment (Chauhan et al. 2015; Clark and Tunaru 2003). As
research has changed focus from risk events to sources of risk, definitions that conceptualise
political risk as emanating from internal instability, anticipated and unanticipated government
actions, or government discontinuities, all brought about by social, economic, or political
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imperatives in a country’s internal or relevant external environment need to be applied (Chauhan
et al. 2015; Fatehi-Sedeh and Safizadeh 1989). On this basis, political risk should not be seen in
isolation but rather understood in the context of broader country risk, determined as a function of
the economic and political events occurring at the sovereign or sub-sovereign level in a country
that threaten firm profitability and are the result of forces and conditions external to the firm and
its industry (Hahn et al. 2009; Oetzel 2005). On this basis, our research aims to expand the
conceptualisation of political risk to be measured through a broader spectrum of dimensions,
including indicators of host country bureaucracy, corruption levels, strength of legal systems,
frequency of organised labour strikes and potential for loss of Intellectual Property (IP).
In this research we define political risk as “the exposure of offshoring companies to
unprovoked interference of external agents, with or without governmental sanction, originating
either within or outside the host country, resulting in the overall restriction of business operating
conditions or the industry specific environment, and negatively impacting on the company’s
subsidiary or outsourcing supplier’s ability to ensure continuity of service delivery with consistent
quality and at agreed cost”. This extended definition allows a holistic approach to understanding
political risk and explicit effects on various industry-specific offshoring entry modes, namely
captive offshoring and offshore outsourcing. The definition also establishes a clear link with
business operations, acknowledging that political events only become a risk if they have potential
implications for business objectives.
Considering emerging global sourcing risks, the choice of entry mode, which refers to the
“... institutional arrangement that makes possible the entry of a firm’s products, technology,
human skills, management, or other resources into a foreign country” (Root 1994, p.5), has
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become a fundamental decision that every firm engaging in international markets needs to address
(Kulkarni 2001; Brouthers 2013). For this research, we consider two main forms of entry mode:
offshore outsourcing, and captive offshoring. In offshore outsourcing, the firm transfers the
internal production of goods or services to a third-party supplier to perform a task, function, or
process (Sanders et al. 2007). In captive offshoring, the buying company engages through a fully
owned subsidiary, or a joint venture partnership, maintaining ownership control, but sacrificing
flexibility (Larsen et al. 2013).
Using a Transaction Cost Economics (TCE) lens, we intend to extend the spectrum of
previous political risk research by identifying the political risks affecting offshoring decisions and
evaluating their impact on entry mode choices. Specifically, the research is guided by the
following research question: How do political risk factors influence the entry mode decisions in
service offshoring?
The contribution of this paper is twofold: First, the research identifies the key political
risks influencing offshoring location decisions and offers an updated conceptualisation of political
risk, contributing to a deeper understanding of the effects of political risk across different types of
service offshore outsourcing, namely Information Technology Outsourcing (ITO), Business
Process Outsourcing (BPO), and Knowledge Process Outsourcing (KPO). Secondly, the research
evaluates the impact of different political risk factors on offshoring entry mode decisions.
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Theoretical Background and Hypothesis Development
Offshoring Entry Mode Decisions under Uncertainty and Risk
While offshoring has traditionally been associated with manufacturing (e.g. Dekkers 2000;
Dekkers 2011), the offshoring of services has seen a similar dramatic growth over the years,
transforming the way businesses manage their operations through digitalisation and offshoring
service processes (Hahn et al. 2009; Modarress and Ansari 2007). Offshored services have
traditionally been classified either as an information technology (IT) service or as a business
process service. If the services are outsourced to an external supplier, these services are referred
to as Information Technology Outsourcing (ITO) or Business Process Outsourcing (BPO). The
offshoring of services has evolved from mainly IT services towards business process services to
gradually more knowledge-based services such as research and development (R&D) (Palugod and
Palugod 2011). The notion of R&D can be defined as services related to the design and
development of new or improved products and processes (Martinez and Garcia 2011), and termed
Knowledge Processing, or Knowledge Process Outsourcing (KPO), if undertaken by an external
supplier. The three outsourcing classifications compound specific industry structures and
properties that potentially may vary in their exposure to political risk, hence this research maintains
an industry specific distinction between ITO, BPO, and KPO.
While understanding key motivations for the firm to engage in offshoring is important, the
determination of the most appropriate entry mode constitutes a critical component of any
offshoring strategy (Kulkarni 2001). As stated by Miller (1992: 312) “A firm’s strategy deals with
the alignment of the organization to its uncertain environment and thereby organizational
strategic choices determine a firm’s exposure to uncertain environmental and organizational
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components that impact firm performance”. The analysis of the entry mode choice implies
determining the degree of commitment that the investing company wants to assume in a given host
country. The choice of entry mode is therefore considered one of the most critical decisions in
offshoring with implications for organisational control, investment risk, and resource commitment
required to ensure successful operations (Zhao, Luo, and Suh 2004).
The argument linking external uncertainty, political risk and entry mode choice is twofold:
first, that risk plays a critical role in entry strategy formation; and second, that a multi-dimensional
perspective of risk yields a more complete understanding of risk impact on risk strategy decisions
(e.g. Brouthers 1995; Demirbag and Glaister 2010; Miller 1992; Werner et al. 1996). It has further
been suggested that the influence of the uncertainty type on a firm’s entry mode choice has not
been sufficiently emphasised (Kulkarni 2001), and that the linkage between risk perceptions and
strategic decisions has not been appropriately established (Brouthers et al. 2002; Chauhan et al.
2015).
Transaction Cost Economics (TCE) proposes that firms evaluate and adapt their structures
of governance to economise and allows firms to decide between markets and hierarchies (Coase,
1937; Madhok, 2007; Williamson, 1975; 1985). Theorising about uncertainty and political risk in
international business, has been largely based on the market failure paradigm, from which TCE
originates; and previous literature has ascertained that TCE has served as the overriding
perspective for theorising entry mode choice, and accordingly transaction-cost related covariates
have been recognised as major determinants of entry mode decision (Zhao et al. 2004; Jahns,
Hartmann and Bals 2006; Ellram et al. 2008; López-Duarte and Vidal-Suarez, 2010; Martinez-
Noya and Garcia-Canal, 2011).
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While other perspectives supplement the entry mode choice discussion, such as
institutional theory, agency theory, and the resource-based view, the basis for this research is that
entry mode choice is an economic decision, and the firm is expected to choose the entry mode that
offers the highest risk-adjusted return on investment (Anderson and Gatignon, 1986). On this basis,
the assessment of TCE determinants remains important as the alignment between entry mode and
transaction properties has performance consequences for the firm and the offshoring operation
(Zhao et al. 2004). In this context, political risk is addressed by weighing the costs and benefits of
political governance structures, policies, and likely political risks in the host country. In the section
that follows we will use this theoretical lens to articulate a series of hypotheses that help explain
the relationship between political risk and entry mode.
Hypotheses Development
The term “uncertainty” has been used in the literature as a reference to the unpredictability or lack
of data on environmental variables that have an impact on corporate performance (van Wyk 2010;
Williamson 1985). The uncertainty of environmental variables reduces the predictability of
corporate performance, increasing business risk exposure (Miller 1992). In the TCE literature,
uncertainty tends to be categorised as the sum of internal uncertainty and external uncertainty
(Erramilli, 1992), stating that both internal and external uncertainties surrounding a transaction
will influence both location and entry mode choice. Previous work has confirmed that uncertainty
in the international environment affects the choice of entry mode (Brouthers 1995; Demirbag and
Glaister 2010; Miller 1992; Werner et al. 1996), suggesting that international uncertainty plays a
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critical role in entry strategy, and that a multi-dimensional perspective of uncertainty is required
for risk management decisions (Brouthers et al. 2002).
On this basis, the research firstly explores the impact of political risk characteristics on
offshoring activities by analysing the effect of political risk on offshoring location flows. Secondly,
the research compares the extent to which offshore outsourcing and captive offshoring differ in
sensitivity to political risk in offshore engagements. Hence, it is guided by the following
hypothesis:
Hypothesis 1: The political risk factors that affect offshoring decisions for offshore
outsourcing activities are different from those that affect captive offshoring activities.
We propose that inconclusive findings on uncertainty and subsequent entry mode choice
are partly due to the non-diversified and simplistic operationalisation of the concept of political
risk. The integration of mechanisms to capture institutional differentiations is one added dimension
of an expanded conceptualisation of external uncertainty (Slangen and Tulder 2009; Zhao et al.
2004). It has further been suggested that the influence of the uncertainty type on a firm’s entry
mode choice has not been sufficiently explored (Kulkarni 2001), nor has the linkage between risk
perceptions and strategic decisions (Brouthers et al. 2002). The determinants of offshoring flows
are therefore suggested to be extended beyond traditional factors, such as government stability,
internal/external conflict and ethnic tensions, to also include aspects of local corruption, quality of
bureaucracy, and law and order (Busse and Hefeker 2007).
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Hypothesis 2: Institutional and regulatory factors in the host country are positively related
to the volume of offshore outsourcing activities.
Transaction cost determinants are considered industry- and activity- specific (Graf and
Mudambi 2005), underlining the need to employ a differentiated approach to various forms of
offshore outsourcing activities, i.e., ITO, BPO, and KPO. As external uncertainties can have an
impact on a firm at both industry- and country- specific levels, theoretical predictions will be
subject to industry- and country- specific control variables. The industry’s moderating effect on
the impact of country risk may be eliminated if more dimensions of environmental uncertainty,
such as protection of IP rights, can be captured in future empirical testing of the relationship
between external uncertainty and offshoring (Zhao et al. 2004).
The research assumes that political risk exposure related to the loss of IP and contract
enforcement risks become increasingly important as the knowledge content of services increases.
On this basis, we further hypothesise that the knowledge content of the offshoring activity is a key
distinction for political risk exposure and the corresponding choice of entry mode; i.e., offshore
outsourcing versus captive offshoring. Hence services with a low knowledge content are assumed
to be more comfortably outsourced to third parties, while services with a high knowledge content
are maintained internally through a captive entry mode. This notion highlights the potentially
moderating effect of specific outsourcing activities; i.e., ITO, BPO, or KPO, noting that firms tend
to ensure more internal control for high value processing through captive engagement modes,
rather than exposing the value content to a third-party supplier through outsourcing.
11
These assumptions support the notion that when imperfect markets affected by bounded
rationality and opportunism lead to higher transaction costs, an internal governance structure will
be more attractive (Anderson and Gatignon 1986; Cui 2017; Kull et al. 2014). For example, in host
countries with limited institutional capacity, local suppliers may use legal loopholes or
bureaucracy to act with self-interest, constituting a risk of opportunistic behaviour. Consistent with
the TCE perspective we hypothesise that companies will only engage in service offshoring with a
high knowledge content in environments with a correspondingly high institutional and legal
certainty. Hence, we hypothesise that:
Hypothesis 3: Institutional and regulatory factors in the host country are positively related
to the volume of offshore outsourcing activities with a higher knowledge content (KPO).
Research Design and Method
In exploring dependence relationships between offshoring and political risk, our research applies
a multivariate regression analysis. Multivariate regression is considered one of the preeminent
techniques of multivariate analysis, which has as its purpose “… to measure, explain and predict
the degree of relationship among variates (weighed combinations of variables)” (Hair et al.
2011: 3). Specifically, multivariate regression is used to determine the equation that describe the
relations of a set of variables that respond simultaneously to changes in other variables (Hair et
al. 2011). This is closely aligned with the objective of this research as we intend to understand
how a set of political risk factors collectively influence the entry mode decisions in service
offshoring. This technique not only is extensively used in economics and management research
12
but also has been widely used to investigate topics related to offshoring and outsourcing (e.g.
Broedner et al. 2009; Li et al. 2010; Luo et al. 2012; Mishra et al. 2017).
The regression analysis leverages a set of 12 political risk indicators as independent variables
(Table 1). At a first level of analysis, the dependent variable was the volume of either offshore
outsourcing or captive offshoring flows; at a second level of analysis, the dependent variable was
the type of activity (ITO/BPO/KPO) (Table 2). The regression analysis identifies the independent
variables that are statistically significant (Hair et al. 2011), highlighting political risks that most
significantly predict flows into offshore destinations through either an offshore outsourcing or
captive offshoring entry mode.
Selection of Independent Variables
The independent variables are drawn from previous qualitative research by Hansen et al. (2017)
on political risk exposure perceptions across the offshore sourcing industry. Previous research used
a repertory grid analysis technique to capture the frequency and perceived impact of these
independent variables on offshoring engagements (Hansen et al. 2017). The research identified
home country risk featuring as the dominant political risk concern for the industry, while for
location decisions, it identified institutional indicators such as host country bureaucracy,
corruption, staff safety, currency stability, efficiency of legal systems, frequency of organised
labour strikes, and potential for loss of intellectual property (IP). In addition, political and socio-
economic concerns such as host government stability and social unrest were identified as key
considerations (Hansen et al. 2017).
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The political risk categories identified by Hansen et al. (2017) are operationalised drawing
on data extracted from the Global Competitiveness Index (GCI) developed by the World Economic
Forum (WEF 2014), combined with data from the PRS Group Political Risk Index (PRSG 2014).
The independent political risk variables are defined in Table 1, with N indicating the country
assessments for each risk indicator category from 2006 to 2014 across 92 countries in the sample
(See Appendix 1).
[Insert Table 1 near here].
The risk indicators are measured on a 1-7 scale (where a higher score suggests better
performance) and vary in sample size as complete time series data are not available equally for all
destinations. To overcome this challenge, the years with missing data were classified in SPSS as
system-missing data values, allowing the research to run the regression analysis excluding data
either list-wise or pair-wise. A comparative analysis was first run using the list-wise exclusion
methodology resulting in 265 observations, and then with a pair-wise methodology yielding 458
to 828 observations. As using list-wise or the pair-wise exclusion had no significant impact on the
key outcome of the analysis; therefore, the pair-wise exclusion approach was applied to benefit
from larger samples.
Selection of Dependent Variables
One of the challenges with researching political risk in the context of the offshore outsourcing is
the absence of existing data sets that match the applied definition as a unique entry mode form.
The World Trade Organization (WTO) has previously used the International Monetary Fund (IMF)
Balance of Payment (BoP6) statistics to assess the overall offshore services trade, to measure the
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impact of offshore outsourcing on employment (WTO 2005). The BoP6 statistics reflect the inflow
and outflow of transactions in an economy consisting of “the institutional units that are resident
in the economic territory of that economy” and “has the dimension of legal jurisdiction as well as
physical location” (IMF 2007, 50). The BoP6 records the net position in terms of debits and credits
of individual transactions, providing a net position of an economy in terms of trade in services.
For this research, the BoP6 services account data, the credit exports of services, are used as the
basis for determining the volume of offshore outsourcing activities being exported from a specific
location. The research further used the sum of the three following BoP6 segments as the
consolidated service offshoring export (credit) of the individual country, and the individual
segments as a proxy for ITO, BPO, and KPO flows. This allowed us to compare the effect of
political risk factors on offshore outsourcing versus captive outsourcing activities.
Computer and information services (CIS)
The BoP6 (IMF 2007) includes Computer and Information Services (CIS) as a sub-component of
Telecommunications, Computer, and Information services. The CIS segment of the BoP6 includes
computer services consisting of hardware and software related services and data-processing
services (IMF 2007) and is used as a proxy for ITO.
The Other Business Services (OBS) account provides the best available proxy for business
and research process outsourcing flows (WTO 2005). Through the IMF database filtering
mechanism in BoP6, the OBS data is divided into two categories relevant to offshore outsourcing
research:
Research and development (R&D): The R&D Services data reflect services that are
associated with basic research, applied research, and the experimental development of new
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products and processes. Activities in the physical sciences, social sciences, and humanities are
covered, including the development of operating systems that represent technological advances
and commercial research related to electronics, pharmaceuticals, and biotechnology (IMF 2007).
The data component is used as a proxy for Knowledge-based Outsourcing (KPO), as it captures
the component of offshore outsourcing that includes outsourcing with a high knowledge content.
Remaining business services: A further subcategory of OBS includes “Business and other
services”, such as transport, construction, and computing, which may be subcontracted. These
services are classified into the “appropriate specific service categories, computing, or other
business services” (IMF 2007). By excluding the transport and construction services, and the
computer and R&D services, the residual flows in the OBS segment are used as a proxy for BPO.
Per WTO (2005), for captive offshoring, few national statistics allow for the identification of cross-
border transactions between affiliate and non-affiliate firms. Hence this research uses the FDI data
drawn from the UNCTAD FDI statistics database (UNCTAD 2014) in line with previous political
risk research (Busse and Hefeker 2007), as the basis for exploring captive offshoring.
Table 2 summarises the data sources for the dependent variables.
[Insert Table 2 near here].
The regression analysis was conducted in five rounds with the dependent variable set as
either i) consolidated Aggregated Service offshore outsourcing per national economy (all-inclusive
sample); or ii-iv) across activity types (ITO/BPO/KPO) export per national economy or finally as




Political Risk across Aggregate Offshore Outsourcing
In the analysis of aggregate offshore outsourcing flows, the political risk variables were
inserted into the regression analysis randomly, using a forced entry approach. The 12 political risk
indicators were ranked in accordance with the absolute value of the standardised Beta coefficients
allowing for a direct comparison of relative importance with the global offshore outsourcing flows.
Table 3 presents the regression results for aggregate global flows highlighting Beta coefficients, t-
values, and significance levels.
[Table 3 near here].
The findings suggest that the 12 political risk indicators account for 38% (R2) of the
variation in offshore outsourcing flows, and with an F-ratio of 22.151 (p<.001), suggesting that
the regression is significant. The method applied further allowed for a classification of the
individual risk indicators’ impact on offshore outsourcing flows, providing an indication of relative
importance across the spectrum of political risks. Of the 12 political risk indicators included in the
regression, five were significant: IP protection, burden of customs procedures, quality of
bureaucracy, internal conflict, and geopolitical risk. The results indicate that for each unit of
increase in IP protection, the offshore outsourcing export from the host country increases by 0.692
units, suggesting a high level of sensitivity by the offshore industry to IP protection in their location
decisions. Similarly, for each unit of increase in quality of bureaucracy, the offshore outsourcing
flow increases by 0.305 units. On the other hand, outsourcing exports from the host country
decreases when there is an improvement in the burden of customs, internal conflict, and reduction
of geopolitical risk. While this might appear counter-intuitive, the findings suggest that the
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political risk determinants for offshore outsourcing location decisions are mainly focused on
institutional and regulatory factors, while traditional consideration of internal and external
instability has a less significant role and concerns are overruled by cost saving potential.
The Durbin-Watson statistic at .411 suggests a possible positive correlation between
adjacent residuals in the model or positive autocorrelation, possibly instigated by using time series
data. A collinearity analysis further indicated that at this stage there was likely to be collinearity
between three indicators; namely, efficiency of legal frameworks, judicial independence, and
corruption. We then checked the Variance Inflation Factors (VIF) for all indicators in the
regression. None of the VIF were higher than 10 (Hair et al. 2010), hence we kept the indicators
in the regression.
Political Risk across Offshore Outsourcing Typologies
As with the aggregated volumes of offshore outsourcing flows, the same methodology was
applied to each of the ITO, BPO, and KPO data sets to determine the relative importance of
political risk variables across these specific segments of offshore outsourcing activities. The results
for ITO offshore outsourcing given in Table 4 indicate that export increases by 0.265 units for
each unit of increase in quality of bureaucracy, by 0.177 units for each unit of increase in level of
cooperation in labour-employer relations, and by 0.292 units for each unit of increase in judicial
independence levels. However, ITO exports decrease by 0.416 units for every unit of improvement
in internal conflict levels and by 0.260 for every improvement in the burden of customs procedures.
[Table 4 near here].
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The results for BPO related offshore outsourcing in Table 5 indicate that exports from the
host country increase by 0.744 units for each unit of increase in the levels of IP protection, by
0.241 for every unit increase in quality of bureaucracy, and by 0.200 units for every unit of
improvement in corruption levels. Similarly, the findings indicate that exports decrease by 0.329
units for each unit of improvement in the burden of customs procedures, and by 0.154 units for
each unit of improvement in geo-political risk at the host location. This is in line with the responses
of the dependent variable to the changes in the burden of customs procedures and external conflict
in the analyses for aggregated outsourcing (Table 3) and ITO (Table 4) volumes.
[Table 5 near here].
The results for the impact of political risk in KPO-related offshore outsourcing in Table 6
indicate that exports increase by 0.935 units for each unit of increase in the level of IP protection
at the host location. Similarly, the findings indicate that exports of KPO-related offshore
outsourcing decrease by 0.505 units for each unit of improvement in burden of customs procedures
and by 0.265 units for every unit of improvement in staff security levels at the host location.
[Table 6 near here].
Compared to the aggregated offshore outsourcing, ITO, BPO, and KPO flows are explained
by three significant independent variables of political risk indicators. Similar to BPO, KPO flows
are significantly determined by the level of intellectual property protection in the host country,
suggesting that both BPO and KPO have significant knowledge content. The direction of burden
of customs procedures could be explained in a similar manner, as was explained in the aggregate
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analysis, namely that companies choose to operate in imperfect business environments due to the
cost benefit trade-offs. The reason for a negative impact of staff security on KPO flows could be
explained by a variable not included in the regression: cost of labour. The cost of labour for highly
educated staff in countries with high security is relatively higher, while companies can access
similarly educated staff at lower cost, in the context of environments with higher insecurity.
Political Risk and Captive Offshoring flows
Following the same methodology as for the aggregated offshore outsourcing data, the political risk
variables were analysed against the captive offshoring flow data. The findings in Table 7 highlight
the individual risk indicators’ impact in the context of captive offshoring. The results indicate that
volume increases by 0.733 units for each unit of increase in IP protection, by 0.269 for each unit
of increase in the quality of bureaucracy, and by 0.215 units for every unit of improvement in
corruption levels. On the other hand, flows decrease by 0.353 units for every unit of improvement
in judicial independence, by 0.312 units for every unit improvement in burden of customs
procedures, by 0.154 for every unit increase in geopolitical risk, and finally by 0.184 units for
every improvement in staff security concerns.
[Table 7 near here].
Having considered the analysis for aggregated offshore outsourcing, ITO, BPO, and KPO, the
directions of the coefficients for judicial independence, burden of customs procedures, external
conflict, and staff security in the regression analysis of the captive offshoring are not a surprise.
There are possible non-political risk-related factors confounding these indicators, which are
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usually highly correlated with the GDP and the labour costs of the host country. The value of the
R2 is stated as .291, indicating that the 12 political risk indicators account for a total of 29.1% of
the variation in captive offshoring flows.
Discussion
The research applied a multiple linear regression methodology for both offshore outsourcing
export data and captive offshoring flows, ranking the 12 key political risk variables in accordance
with their ability to predict offshoring inflows to various host locations. Three hypotheses are
tested and the results in Table 8 are concluded. The results confirm that political risk, in the choice
of outsourcing supplier locations, is a relevant and important factor in determining supplier and
location choice.
Of the 12 political risk indicators included in the regression, five were significant for offshore
outsourcing engagements as an entry mode, namely: IP protection, burden of customs procedures,
and quality of bureaucracy, internal conflict, and external conflict. The results indicate that for
each unit of increase in IP protection and quality of bureaucracy, the level of exports from the host
country increases, suggesting a high level of sensitivity by the offshore industry to institutional
and regulatory factors in their location decisions.
Surprisingly, results also show that offshore outsourcing flows from the host country
decrease when there is an improvement in burden of customs and external conflict. Although these
results may appear counterintuitive at first, they could be explained by factors that are not political-
risk-related and hence not included in the analysis. Most offshore outsourcing is toward those
countries that perform poorly across these indicators, due to other reasons such as lower labour
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costs; hence the regression suggests a negative relationship between these political risk indicators
and the outsourcing flows. The findings suggest that the operating environment in which offshore
outsourcing is taking place is often impacted upon by burdensome customs regulations and
potential for conflict. The political risk exposure can be seen in the context of trade-offs with
labour cost arbitrage and lower operating costs, highlighting the potential for disruption in service
chains if not monitored and managed.
Similarly, the results suggest a positive correlation between captive offshoring flows and
IP protection, quality of bureaucracy, including corruption levels. The model indicates a negative
relationship between geopolitical risks, staff security, burden of customs procedures and judicial
independence. Compared with the findings from the offshore outsourcing activities, the findings
suggest a consistent overlap of key substantial variables, including IP protection, quality of
bureaucracy and burden of customs procedures – all significant for both outsourced and captive
offshoring. This significant finding emphasises that institutional and regulatory factors in the host
country are essential to both offshoring activities.
The findings further suggest that both forms of offshoring activities operate in external
environments characterised by high levels of customs burdens and instability. It should be noted
that flows associated with both outsourcing and captive activities appear related to environments
that are considered vulnerable to geopolitical risk. This negative correlation suggests that most
offshoring activities, whether captive or outsourced, take place in developing economies to
leverage cost arbitrage, and that companies are identifying strategies and developing capabilities
to deal with these challenges (Barney 1999).
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The results can be considered as statistically significant and partially supporting H1, that
“The political risk factors that affect offshoring decisions for offshore outsourcing activities are
different from those that affect captive offshoring activities”. The important distinction between
offshore outsourcing and captive offshoring is that political risk exposure is linked to the nature
or type of political risks being considered. While the findings suggest that both offshore
outsourcing and captive offshoring are equally sensitive to institutional and regulatory factors
relating to IP protection, quality of bureaucracy, risks related to staff security, corruption and
judicial independence are more significant in activities with a physical presence.
The research further set out to determine if concerns with institutional and regulatory factors have
an impact on offshore outsourcing flows in terms of engagement location. The results confirm a
positive and significant relationship between offshore outsourcing flows and IP protection and
quality of bureaucracy. Similarly, the negative and significant relationship between the burden of
customs procedures and offshore outsourcing flows further confirms, together with internal and
external conflict and government stability variables, that offshore outsourcing engagements extend
into often unstable and unpredictable environments. Overall, the results lend partial support to H2
stating that “The institutional and regulatory factors in the host country are positively related to
the volume of offshore outsourcing activities”. However, the results allow us to conclude that the
multi-dimensionality of political risk causes a bidirectional effect on offshoring volumes,
confirming the need for a more nuanced definition of the construct.
The research finally explored the association between knowledge-based outsourcing (KPO)
inflows and institutional capacity, i.e., legal enforcement of IP rights and contracts in the host
location. The research assumed that if the institutional capacity rises, the willingness to engage in
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offshore outsourcing with a higher knowledge content will also increase. For this purpose, the
research explored the impact of political risk variables across three identified types of offshore
outsourcing, i.e., ITO/BPO/KPO to present a comparative analysis. The analysis yielded R2 values
for ITO: .267, BPO: .368. and KPO: .277.
The findings suggest a consistent concern with the quality of bureaucracy for both ITO and
BPO engagements, while this was not found to be a significant indicator for KPO engagements.
However, IP protection was by far the most significant variable for KPO with a coefficient of
0.935, and for BPO at 0.744, while non-significant for ITO engagements. Across the three offshore
outsourcing activities, the impact of the burden of customs procedures was significant for all, with
the largest coefficient for KPO engagements. The results further highlighted judicial independence
to have a positive and significant correlation with ITO, a negative and significant correlation with
BPO, and no correlation with KPO.
In terms of activity-specific findings, ITO has a positive and significant correlation with
cooperation in labour-employer relations, suggesting higher sensitivity to labour relations due to
possible higher labour intensity of the engagement type. Similarly, BPO has a positive and
significant correlation with corruption, and KPO with staff security.
The indication of a negative relationship between ITO and internal conflict suggests that ITO
activities are more often outsourced to locations more exposed to internal conflict. One reason for
this could be that the nature of the ITO activities is easier to divert in the case of unrest and/or be
completed through home-based arrangements as part of a business continuity plan. A post hoc
review of the dependent variable data also highlights that ITO outsourcing remains dominated by
24
the India market, which by the PRSG data is classified as prone to internal conflict, highlighting
the need for more detailed location classifications.
The finding that BPO activities have a positive relationship with the quality of bureaucracy
suggests that typical BPO activities, such as the management of call centres and back-office
support activities, is more labour-intensive and requires more regulatory engagement with
governments for the local suppliers of services. As BPO outsourcing contracts often become more
integrated and require more long term and in-depth relationships, it would make sense that
corruption and bureaucracy-related issues are more of a collective concern and hence a shared
problem with the service buyer. Similarly, to leverage cost arbitrage for labour-intensive back-
office work, offshore outsourcing would often take place in regions characterised by geopolitical
tension, but less so by internal conflict, which could cause service delivery problems for the BPO
activity.
As expected, the KPO segment came out with a significantly positive relationship with the
strength of IP rights frameworks to protect any R&D activities conducted by the outsourcing
companies. A more detailed review of KPO flows highlights that most KPO activities are directed
to locations such as the United States, Germany, Canada, and other EU locations. Overall, the
results can be considered as statistically significant, indicating a strong statistical relationship
between KPO flows and institutional capacity to protect against IP loss. More surprisingly, IP
rights protection also has the highest coefficient for BPO, suggesting that BPO service delivery
has an increasingly high knowledge content of concern for the buyers of offshore outsourcing
services. While the findings are statistically significant, the research cannot establish direct
causality between the parameters and therefore partly supports H3: “The level of institutional and
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regulatory factors in the host country is positively related to the volume of offshore outsourcing
activities with a higher knowledge content (KPO)”. The findings suggest that to attract KPO
activities, the location needs to ensure the presence of an appropriate IP regulatory framework.
[Table 8 near here].
Contributions, Implications, and Further Research
This research focused on political risk, a central construct in determining ownership, and locational
and internalisation attractions (Agarwal and Feils 2007; Agarwal and Ramaswami 1992; Dunning
1980; 2000). The aim was to analyse the implications of political risk in the context of offshore
outsourcing and captive offshoring. A review of the literature suggested that previous political risk
research has generally been limited to captive offshoring, because these operations represent a
more complex investment form than that of offshore outsourcing (Agarwal and Feils, 2007). The
perception has been that since offshore outsourcing entry mode has less capital at stake, and no
physical facilities at risk, political risk consideration should be of less significant concern. On that
note, there has been an absence of an analytical framework that goes beyond captive offshoring
and that can adequately contribute, either in a taxonomic or operational sense, to improving
political risk management within the offshore outsourcing sector.
Implications for Theory
While TCE has been the main theoretical framework for the conversation on political risk
and offshoring, the theory and its corresponding empirical findings have not been conclusive on
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how political risk impacts on offshoring location and entry mode decisions. This research has
offered a new conceptualisation and operationalisation of the political risk construct, allowing for
more granularity in the differentiation between various dimensions of formal uncertainty and their
implications for offshoring. The identification of more relevant political risk factors, such as
institutional frameworks, support emerging criticism contending that construct needs to be
conceptualised more broadly and to incorporate the wider concept of governance infrastructure
(Slangen and Tulder 2009; Zhao et al. 2004).
The findings confirm the importance of incorporating industry-specific moderators into
TCE-based entry mode perceptions of external uncertainty. All TCE determinants are industry-
specific, underlining the need to apply a differentiated approach to offshore outsourcing i.e., across
ITO, BPO, and KPO activities. A review of the relationship with key political risk variables across
offshore outsourcing engagements confirms that the offshore outsourcing industry cannot be
assessed as one holistic group in terms of risk exposure, but should be reviewed through the lens
of its activities. This affirms that external uncertainty exposure is moderated by industry type and
activity and needs to be systematically incorporated into the notion of external uncertainty and its
impact on entry mode.
The findings also have implications for other TCE constructs, such as bounded rationality,
opportunism, and asset specificity. The research validated that institutional capacity, such as legal
enforcement of IP rights and contract enforcement, becomes increasingly important as the
knowledge content increases. These findings support the TCE notion that cases where the market
is imperfect due to bounded rationality and opportunism, leading to increased transaction costs
due to uncertainty, an internal governance structure will be considered more attractive (Anderson
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and Gatignon, 1986). For example, in host countries with limited governance infrastructure or
institutional capacity, local suppliers may use loopholes in the legal system or bureaucracy to act
in self-interest, hence constituting a risk of opportunistic behaviour.
The research also impacts the notions of asset specificity and opportunism, which are
considered key factors in explaining vertical integration (Williamson 1985). TCE suggests that
when asset specificity increases, the “balance shifts in favour of internal organisation”
(Williamson 1985, 90). In the context of service offshoring, the research proposes to introduce the
concept of knowledge specificity to be considered as an additional determinant of vertical
integration decisions.
The research is in line with the call for further research on the questions of how and where
to source (Asmussen et al. 2016; Kotabe and Murray 2004). While the political risk research to
date is extensive, research remains unable to analytically disentangle causality between political
risk types and their impact on investment strategies.
Implications for Practice and Policy
At a practical level, the findings form the basis for developing a differentiated political risk
map of typologies that can capture the nuances in offshoring risks, allowing for a more accurate
risk assessment of various offshoring locations and the effective monitoring of post-contractual
political risk exposure. In an era of changing geo-politics and populist challenges to the political
establishments in the US and Europe, there is an increasing need to understand and navigate the
new emerging political environment. Policy discussions around limiting US H1B visas, data
privacy restrictions and a general reversal of the mechanisms of globalisation are impacting the
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underlying cost assumptions of the offshoring business model, in both host and buyer countries.
In this new and emerging political environment, the research provides the basis for developing a
more relevant weighted offshore outsourcing risk index to support the industry in developing risk
informed location decisions. The index can serve as a tool for location decisions, for both captive
offshoring and supplier selection, plus provide continued post-contract monitoring of changes in
underlying risk indicators.
The research further allows for assessments across offshore engagement types, both in
terms of entry mode and value-content, enabling detailed industry-specific risk assessments
focusing on the risks with the highest potential impact on that specific engagement type. The
visibility on industry-specific risk exposure will help companies more confidently navigate and
monitor the political environment in which they need to operate. Similarly, the research findings
provide a guide for governments for attracting offshoring activities, by understanding the
underlying concerns of the industry, and the potential pull effects of different policy interventions.
The findings further allow for targeting certain types of offshoring, for example some governments
are keen on attracting KPO activities, while less interested in ITO and BPO types of engagements.
The granularity of the research findings allows for more detailed industry development plans and
targeted investments that match the development agenda of host countries.
As potential host countries compete to attract offshore outsourcing activities to enhance
employment and knowledge transfer opportunities into their economies, it would be prudent for
policymakers to take note of the importance of strengthening institutional and regulatory factors.
If a host country is seeking to attract outsourcing within the areas of R&D, it would be especially
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important to ensure that the appropriate IP regulatory frameworks are in place, while for more
labour-intensive ITO activities, a well-functioning labour market would have a higher impact.
Limitations and Further Research
While the findings indicate a predictive ability of the identified political risk indicators at a
consolidated level of 38%, suggesting political risk is a valid consideration, there are a range of
additional potential moderators pertaining to the external business environment, prior firm
experience, and business volume. The findings indicate that the premises of TCE alone may be
insufficient to explain a firm’s location decisions or whether to follow offshore outsourcing or
captive offshoring entry mode when offshoring ITO, BPO, or KPO business processes. Further
research should investigate complementary theories such as Agency Theory, Social Exchange
Theory, and the Resource Based View, to construct more comprehensive explanations of the
service offshoring phenomenon. Similarly, previous operationalisations of TCE have not
appropriately factored in the conditioning effect of the risk adaptive behaviour of firms. It would
be valuable to develop a comprehensive model, including a full range of internal and external
variables, to enhance the predictability of firm location and entry mode decisions.
Conclusions
This research set out to determine how political risk factors affect service offshoring entry mode
decisions; adopting a broad definition of political risk which included institutional and regulatory
factors. The research confirmed that political risk is a genuine issue of concern in offshore
outsourcing, despite technically being a means of “outsourcing” risk to suppliers. The research
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indicated that the 12 identified political risks accounted for 38% of the variability in offshore
outsourcing flows, implying that concerns about service disruptions and/or cost implications of
external uncertainties feature as a factor in supplier and location decisions. This expanded
definition of political risk contributes to TCE by providing a more comprehensive and nuanced
conceptualisation of the construct.
The findings highlight a consistent overlap of key predictive variables, including IP
protection; quality of bureaucracy, and burden of customs for both offshore outsourcing and
captive offshoring activities. This is a significant finding as it shows that institutional and
regulatory factors in the host country are a key concern for offshoring in general. The important
distinction between offshore outsourcing and captive offshoring activities is more specifically
related to the kinds of political risk. The research yielded significant and positive relationships
with IP protection and bureaucracy, for both entry modes, while captive offshoring activities were
also significantly associated with security related variables, such as staff security and internal
conflict.
The research offers an expanded conceptualisation of political risk in the context of
offshoring. This reconceptualisation shows good promise for improved predictive ability in the
choice of offshoring entry mode, and as a result has significant implications for theory, practice,
and policy. We hope the research serves as a stepping stone for researchers, practitioners, and
policymakers concerned with the risk implications of offshoring.
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92 Albania, Algeria, Argentina, Armenia, Australia, Austria, Azerbaijan,
Bahrain, Bangladesh, Belgium, Bolivia, Botswana, Brazil, Bulgaria,
Cameroon, Canada, China, Colombia, Costa Rica, Croatia, Cyprus, Czech
Republic, Dominican Rep., Egypt, El Salvador, Estonia, Ethiopia,
Finland, France, Germany, Ghana, Greece, Guatemala, Guyana,
Honduras, Hungary, India, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Jamaica, Jordan,
Kazakhstan, Korea Republic, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Malawi,
Malta, Mongolia, Morocco, Mozambique, Namibia, Netherlands, New
Zealand, Nicaragua, Nigeria, Norway, Oman, Pakistan, Panama,
Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Russia, Saudi
Arabia, Senegal, Singapore, Serbia Republic, Slovakia, Slovenia, South
Africa, Spain, Sri Lanka, Sweden, Switzerland, Tanzania, Thailand,
Trinidad & Tobago, Tunisia, Turkey, Uganda, Ukraine, United Kingdom,
United States, Uruguay, Venezuela, Yemen, Republic, Zambia1.
Services, Other Business
Services, Technical, trade-
related, and other business
services
BPO 92 (same as above)
Computer and Information
Services (CIS)
ITO 61 Albania, Algeria, Argentina, Armenia, Australia, Austria, Azerbaijan,
Bangladesh, Belgium, Bolivia, Botswana, Brazil, Bulgaria, Canada,
Colombia, Costa Rica, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Dominican Rep., El
Salvador, Estonia, Finland, Germany, Greece, Guatemala, Guyana,
Hungary, India, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Jamaica, Kazakhstan, Korea
Republic, Latvia, Lithuania, Malta, Mongolia, Morocco, Mozambique,
Namibia, Nicaragua, Norway, Pakistan, Panama, Philippines, Poland,
Portugal, Romania, Russia, Serbia Republic, Slovakia, Slovenia, Sri





KPO (R&D) 43 Albania, Argentina, Australia, Austria, Azerbaijan, Bangladesh, Belgium,
Botswana, Brazil, Bulgaria, Canada, Costa Rica, Croatia, Cyprus, Czech
Republic, Estonia, Ethiopia, Finland, Germany, Greece, Hungary, India,
Ireland, Italy, Korea Republic, Latvia, Lithuania, Malawi, Malta, New
Zealand, Norway, Pakistan, Philippines, Poland, Portugal, Romania,
Russia, Singapore, Serbia Republic, Slovenia, Spain, Ukraine, USA2.
1 Note that complete data sets were not available for typical offshore outsourcing destinations such as
Indonesia, Malaysia and Mexico hence they are not included in the analysis.
2 Note that R&D data were not available for large economies such as the United Kingdom, France and Japan.
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Table 1: Description of political risk independent variables (Time series 2006-2014)
No Risk Indicator Category Data Source Definition N
1. Quality of bureaucracy PRS Group Quality of (Institutional) Bureaucracy 828
2. Burden of customs procedures WEF/GCI Burden of customs procedures 729
3. Intellectual property protection WEF/GCI Level of IP protection 723
4. Corruption WEF/GCI Corruption levels at host location 819
5. Contract enforcement WEF/GCI Local legal system’s ability to enforce
contracts
549
6. Currency fluctuations PRS Group Stability of local currency 827
7. Organised labour strike WEF/GCI Disruption through local strikes 814
8. Host government stability PRS Group Changes in Government policies 828
9. Judicial independence WEF/GCI Judiciary independence from influence 814
10. Internal conflict PRS Group Risk of internal conflict and violence 828
11. Geopolitical risk PRS Group Regional instability affecting business
continuity
828




Table 2: Dependent variables and time series intervals
No. Dependent Variable(s)
Variable Name Period Definition of Data Source
1. Aggregated Service offshore
outsourcing (outsourcing) per
national economy.
2006-2014 Export (Credit) of Aggregate BoP Services Credit;
Computer and Information Services (CIS), Research &
Development Services and Other Business Services as
per annual BOP6.
2. ITO export per national
economy.
2006-2014 Export (Credit) of Services, Computer and Information
Services (CIS) as per annual BOP6.
3. BPO export per national
economy.
2006-2014 Export (Credit) of Services, Other Business Services,
Technical, trade-related, and other business services as
per annual BOP6.
4. KPO (R&D) export per
national economy.
2006-2014 Export (Credit) of Services, Other Business Services,
Research and Development Services) as per annual
BOP6.
5. Foreign Direct Investment
(FDI) inflow per national
economy (captive offshoring)
2006-2014 UNCTAD FDI database (2014) - Net FDI inflows.
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Table 3: Ranking of political risk indicators (aggregate global offshore outsourcing flows)
Indicator Description Beta t-value Sig.
Intellectual property protection 0.692 5.789*** .000
Burden of customs procedures -0.379 -4.783*** .000
Quality of bureaucracy 0.305 4.260*** .000
Internal conflict -0.167 -3.158** .002
Corruption 0.148 1.869 .062
Contract enforcement -0.096 -0.895 .371
Geopolitical risk -0.094 -2.075* .039
Organised labour strike 0.076 1.391 .165
Host government stability -0.068 -1.567 .118
Staff security -0.065 -1.102 .271
Judicial independence -0.053 -0.518 .605
Currency fluctuations 0.003 0.085 .932
R R Square Adjusted R Square






.616 .380 .363 12844416079.70 .380 22.151 12
Notes: * p–value < .05; ** p–value < .01; *** p–value < .001
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Table 4: Ranking of political risk - impact on offshore outsourcing flows – ITO
Indicator Description Beta T-value Sig.
Internal conflict -0.416 -5.890*** .000
Quality of bureaucracy 0.265 2.782** .006
Burden of customs procedures -0.260 -2.462* .014
Judicial independence 0.292 2.152* .032
Intellectual property protection 0.291 1.828 .069
Contract enforcement -0.183 -1.284 .200
Organised labour strike 0.177 2.448* .015
Corruption -0.150 -1.425 .155
Host government stability -0.047 -0.807 .421
Staff Security 0.133 1.693 .091
Geopolitical risk 0.108 1.780 .076
Currency fluctuations -0.022 -0.435 .664
Offshore
Activity




R Square Change F Change df1
ITO .517 .267 .237 .267 8.782 12 .401
Notes: * p–value < .05; ** p–value < .01; *** p–value < .001
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Table 5: Ranking of political risk - impact on offshore outsourcing flows – BPO
Indicator Description Beta T-value Sig.
Intellectual property protection 0.744 6.157*** .000
Burden of customs procedures -0.329 -4.103*** .000
Judicial independence -0.245 -2.377* .018
Quality of bureaucracy 0.241 3.336** .001
Corruption 0.200 2.500** .013
Geopolitical risk -0.154 -3.361** .001
Staff security -0.116 -1.947 .052
Host government stability -0.084 -1.910 .057
Internal conflict -0.070 -1.299 .195
Contract enforcement 0.063 0.585 .559
Organised labour strike 0.013 0.237 .813
Currency fluctuations 0.008 0.211 .833
Offshore
Activity




R Square Change F Change df1
BPO .606 .368 .350 .368 20.980 12 .501
Notes: * p–value < .05; ** p–value < .01; *** p–value < .001
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Table 6: Ranking of political risk - impact on offshore outsourcing flows – KPO
Indicator Description Beta T-value Sig.
Intellectual property protection 0.935 4.936*** .000
Burden of customs procedures -0.505 -4.017*** .000
Staff security -0.265 -2.823** .005
Quality of bureaucracy 0.206 1.816 .071
Contract enforcement -0.196 -1.157 .249
Corruption 0.195 1.559 .120
Judicial independence -0.180 -1.112 .267
Organised labour strike 0.078 0.909 .364
Host government stability 0.105 1.528 .128
Geopolitical risk -0.052 -0.717 .474
Currency fluctuations 0.048 0.782 .435













KPO .527 .277 .234 .277 6.429 12 .293
Notes: * p–value < .05; ** p–value < .01; *** p–value < .001
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Table 7: Ranking of political risk indicators in captive offshoring flows
Indicator Description Beta T-value Sig.
Intellectual property protection 0.733 5.806*** .000
Judicial independence -0.353 -3.272** .001
Burden of customs procedures -0.312 -3.727*** .000
Quality of bureaucracy 0.269 3.554*** .000
Corruption 0.215 2.576* .010
Staff security -0.184 -2.943** .003
Geopolitical risk -0.154 -3.201** .001
Contract enforcement 0.059 0.522 .602
Currency fluctuations 0.015 0.358 .721
Organised labour strike -0.013 -0.219 .827
Host government stability 0.003 0.075 .940
Internal conflict 0.001 0.025 .980
R R Square Adjusted R Square






.539 .291 .272 370924.63 .291 15.185 12
Notes: * p–value < .05; ** p–value < .01; *** p–value < .001
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Table 8: Hypotheses tested and conclusions
Hypothesis Evidence Conclusion





from those that affect
captive offshoring
activities.
Four political risk factors (Intellectual
Property (IP) protection, Burden of customs
procedures, Quality of bureaucracy, Internal
conflict) are significant in explaining the
variation in the volume of offshore
outsourcing activities [Table 3]
Whereas seven out of 12 political risk
factors (Intellectual Property (IP) protection,
Judicial independence, Burden of customs
procedures, Quality of bureaucracy,
Corruption, Staff security, and Geopolitical
risk) are significant in explaining the
variation in the volume of captive
offshoring activities.
Partially supported.
The findings suggest that the combined
political risk variables account for a
total of 38.0% of the variation in
offshore outsourcing, compared to
29.1% of the variation in captive
offshoring flows.
Although fewer of the political risk
factors are significant for aggregate
offshore outsourcing volume, they can
explain more of the variability in
offshoring volumes.
H2: Institutional and
regulatory factors in the
host country are
positively related to the
volume of offshore
outsourcing activities.
Eight of the 12 institutional and regulatory
factors of political risk are found to be
significant in separate regressions for ITO,
BPO, and KPO.
Among these are Corruption, Geopolitical
risk, Intellectual Property (IP) protection,
Internal conflict, Quality of bureaucracy,
and Staff security, being positively related
to the volume of offshoring. Two variables,
Judicial independence and Burden of
customs procedures are negatively related to
the volume of offshoring activities.
Partially supported.
This result provides the granularity in
understanding the effect of factors that
constitute political risk on the volume
of offshore outsourcing activities. The
results support that political risk is a
multidimensional construct, with bi-
directional effect on offshoring
volumes.
H3: Institutional and
regulatory factors in the
host country are
positively related to the
volume of offshore
outsourcing activities
with a higher knowledge
content (KPO).
Although Intellectual Property (IP)
protection is positively related to the volume
of KPO activities, the other two significant
factors, namely: Burden of customs
procedures and Staff security, are negatively
related to the volume. Discussion of this
result follows.
Partially supported.
This result sheds light on the individual
effects of 12 factors that comprise the
political risk concept. Previously
political risk was used as a holistic
explanatory variable for offshoring
location decisions; now we find support
and the lack of support for individual
factors that make up the political risk;
hence providing a more detailed
explanation of how it impacts
offshoring location decisions.
